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11 - DATA TO THE RESCUE?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Daniel Treisman
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
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Summary

It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.

Sherlock Holmes, in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's “Scandal in Bohemia” (1892)

Facts are stupid things until brought into connection with some general law.

Louis Agassiz, in Scudder (1874)

One response to the previous chapters might be to agree that theory is inconclusive and look to empirical research to determine whether the positive or negative effects of decentralization tend to dominate. “Where theory leaves us completely stranded,” advise Dahl and Tufte (1973, p. 44), “we can be rescued only by data.” It may not be possible to say in the abstract whether a decentralized constitution is better or worse than a more centralized one. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating.

There are several reasons why turning to empirical observations at this point might seem dangerous, if not perverse. First, even if we found the empirical “pudding” to be tasty, we would not know what it was we were consuming. If theory tells us not to expect a consistent relationship between decentralization and most political and economic outcomes, finding such a relationship in one data set gives us no reason to expect similar results in others. For instance, suppose one found a correlation between decentralization and individual liberty in a sample of countries.

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The Architecture of Government
Rethinking Political Decentralization
, pp. 247 - 269
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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  • DATA TO THE RESCUE?
  • Daniel Treisman, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Book: The Architecture of Government
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511619151.013
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  • DATA TO THE RESCUE?
  • Daniel Treisman, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Book: The Architecture of Government
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511619151.013
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • DATA TO THE RESCUE?
  • Daniel Treisman, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Book: The Architecture of Government
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511619151.013
Available formats
×