Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Maritime Power: A Tour D'Horizon
- 2 Maritime Geography, Law of the Sea and Geostrategy
- 3 Military Maritime Power: China and India
- 4 Economics and Maritime Power
- 5 Political Components of Maritime Power
- 6 Techno-Military Dimension of Asian Maritime Power
- 7 Strategic Transactions: China, India and Southeast Asia
- 8 Conclusion
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
3 - Military Maritime Power: China and India
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Maritime Power: A Tour D'Horizon
- 2 Maritime Geography, Law of the Sea and Geostrategy
- 3 Military Maritime Power: China and India
- 4 Economics and Maritime Power
- 5 Political Components of Maritime Power
- 6 Techno-Military Dimension of Asian Maritime Power
- 7 Strategic Transactions: China, India and Southeast Asia
- 8 Conclusion
- Selected Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
There is a strong belief among Asian nations that it was the neglect of ocean frontier security that led to their domination by colonial powers during the 15th to the 19th centuries. For China, its preoccupation with internal wars led to the neglect of the littorals that came to be dominated by the imperialist powers and was the springboard to the domination of the hinterland. Similarly, for India, the littoral dominance by the European powers, first by the Portuguese and then by the British and French resulted in their ascendancy of the Indian heartland. Significantly, for both China and India the colonial-imperial supremacy came from the sea, to the littorals and into the heartland. The foremost strategic objective of China and India therefore is to build autonomous maritime military capability to preclude intrusive dominance of the littorals by any external power.
Soon after independence, China and India were engaged in wars across their land frontiers and military developments were shaped by the strong continental mindset among the ruling elite. It was in this context that the trajectory of the military structures and organization of the two powers was largely built around the army. Naturally the army was the vanguard of the national security structure and entrusted the important role of guarding national frontiers and providing external security. Operationally, the navy and the air force of the two countries were subsumed within the primary role of the army and were adjunct to the land forces. In the Chinese context, its navy was addressed as People's Liberation Army Navy, i.e. PLA Navy and in India it came to be termed as “Cinderella” service. In terms of strategic priorities in decision-making, resource allocation and the formulation of security strategy, the army dominated the national security structure.
However, weakness at sea soon came to haunt the two Asian powers; for China the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954–55 and 1958 witnessed U.S. intervention in support of its ally Taiwan. Significantly, both crises witnessed U.S. aircraft carrier task force deployed in the area and precluded any attempt by the PLA to undertake amphibious landing on Quemoy.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Asian Maritime Power in the 21st CenturyStrategic Transactions China, India and Southeast Asia, pp. 65 - 123Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2011