Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgements
- Glossary
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Military Doctrine and Strategy
- 3 Organization and Force Structure
- 4 Armament and Force Modernization
- 5 Military Training and Officer Education
- 6 Financing Force Modernization and Troops Welfare
- 7 Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
3 - Organization and Force Structure
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgements
- Glossary
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Military Doctrine and Strategy
- 3 Organization and Force Structure
- 4 Armament and Force Modernization
- 5 Military Training and Officer Education
- 6 Financing Force Modernization and Troops Welfare
- 7 Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
This chapter discusses how a weak, small, and disunited Tatmadaw in Myanmar has emerged into a considerably strong, large, and more or less united one, with a dominant role in Myanmar politics. In the process of building a strong and united Tatmadaw, any split along the lines of racial background, organizational origin, and political affiliation was resolved; the gap between staff and field officers was bridged; and competition between intelligence officers and field commanders was settled. Unity of the officer corps was further maintained by giving a fair share of senior command positions to graduates of different schools of training. Since the late 1960s, open split within the Tatmadaw had been more or less eliminated and the occasional factional struggle was managed, sometimes at a considerable cost, to maintain institutional unity. However, despite its growth in force structure the Tatmadaw remained an army of infantry battalions.
Building Unity within the Tatmadaw
At the time of Myanmar's independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw was weak, small and disunited. Cracks appeared along the lines of racial background, political affiliation, organizational origin, and different services. Its unity and operational efficiency were further weakened by the interference of civilians and politicians in military affairs, and the perception gap between staff officers and field commanders. The most serious problem was the tension between Karen officers, coming from the British Burma Army, and Bamar officers, coming from the Patriotic Burmese Force (PBF). For the ex-PBF members, those who served in the British Burma Army were regarded as Kyesar Sittha, soldiers serving foreigners for a living, whereas they regarded themselves as Myochit Sittha, soldiers serving their own people out of patriotism. Generally, ex-PBF officers regarded officers from the ex-British Burma Army (mostly Karen, Kachin, and Chin, as well as Anglo-Indian and Sino-Burman) as “Pro-West”, “Pro-British”, or “Rightists”.
In accordance with the agreement reached at Kandy in September 1945, the Tatmadaw was reorganized by incorporating the British Burma Army and the PBF. The officer corps was also shared by the ex-PBF officers and officers from the British Burma Army or the Army of Burma Reserve Organization (ABRO). The British also decided to form what were known as “class battalions”, based on ethnicity. There were fifteen infantry battalions at the time of independence. Among them, only four were made up of the former members of the PBF.
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- Information
- Building the TatmadawMyanmar Armed Forces Since 1948, pp. 47 - 104Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2009