Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T16:45:12.817Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

12 - Civil Sanctions in Antitrust Public Enforcement

from Part I - General Chapters

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2022

By
Max Huffman
Edited by
Tihamer Tóth
Tihamer Tóth
Affiliation:
Pázmány Peter Catholic University (Budapest, Hungary)
Get access

Summary

The chapter discusses the structure of public enforcement in the US antitrust system, with particular emphasis on the use of civil sanctions in public enforcement of laws governing marketplace competition, and a focus on civil sanctions under the Sherman Act, FTC Act, and parallel state law in the United States. It then argues that the use of civil sanctions in public enforcement is inextricable from the supporting remedial structure, including criminal enforcement and meaningful private enforcement. The chapter explains the theory of civil fines in law enforcement and reasons for a jurisdiction’s choosing one or the other form of sanctions. It then explains the structure of remedies for antitrust violations in the US system, highlighting the three forms of public enforcement and the backstop of private enforcement. It then turns to recent developments in civil remedies, including punitive fines as well as damages and related civil monetary relief. It criticizes the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Abbvie Inc. and interrogates the current Supreme Court case involving AMG Capital, inquiring whether AMG Capital might influence the interpretation of the FTC Act as it applies to competition law enforcement as well as consumer protection enforcement.

Keywords

FTCFederal Trade Commissioncivil finesremediesSherman ActFTC Actpublic enforcement
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Competition Law Sanctions , pp. 205 - 217
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC), “Report and Recommendations” (2007). Available at https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/chapter3.pdf.Google Scholar
Clark, J. Morris, “Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework and Constitutional Analysis” (1976). Minnesota Law Review. 1526, pp. 379–500.Google Scholar
First, Harry “The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties” (2008). NYU School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,. 8, pp. 43–63.Google Scholar
Hovenkamp, Herbert, “A Primer on Antitrust Law Damages” (2011). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1846, pp. 1–59.Google Scholar
International Competition Network (ICN), Cartels Working Group, “Setting of Fines for Cartels in ICN Jurisdictions” (2008; rev’d 2017). Available at www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.Google Scholar
Mann, Kenneth, “Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground between Criminal and Civil Law” (1992). Yale Law Journal. 101, pp. 1795–1873.Google Scholar
Page, William H., “The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations” (1985). Stanford Law Review. 37, pp. 1445–1512.Google Scholar
Waller, Spencer Weber, “The Political Misuse of Antitrust: Doing the Right Thing for the Wrong Reason” (2020). Competition Policy International Antitrust Chron., available at www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-political-misuse-of-antitrust-doing-the-right-thing-for-the-wrong-reason.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×