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30 - Effectiveness of Competition Law Sanctions

Portugal

from Part II - Country Reports

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2022

By
Nuno Castro Marques
Edited by
Tihamer Tóth
Tihamer Tóth
Affiliation:
Pázmány Peter Catholic University (Budapest, Hungary)
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Summary

Nuno Castro Marques presents the Portuguese competition law framework. Portugal was one of those European countries opting to introduce a misdemeanour law, inspired by the German Ordnungswidrigkeit law, but this has now evolved a long way. EU and Portuguese competition laws establish the same potential sanction for all competition infringements: a fine up to 10% of the undertaking turnover. Not only companies but also natural persons may be liable for competition law infringements, and fines applicable to natural persons can go up to 10% of their annual income. Portuguese competition law is fully aligned with the European framework, with the Portuguese Competition Authority (PCA) armed with strong investigation powers, an experienced leniency regime and the full set of mechanisms for speeding up enforcement, such as the settlement or commitment procedures. The results are visible, with general deterrence also making an important contribution, and whenever the PCA adopts a sanctioning decision, especially in cartel cases, it makes front-page news. That was recently the case with a banking cartel, where fourteen banks were fined for exchanging sensitive business information and even the Parliament felt the need to openly condemn the situation in public hearings.

Keywords

PortugalPortuguese competition lawPortuguese Competition AuthorityEU competition lawcompetition policyantitrust
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Competition Law Sanctions , pp. 613 - 636
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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