Book contents
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Analytic Philosophy
- Section One Language, Mind, Epistemology
- Section Two Logic, Metaphysics, Science
- 10 Logic in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century
- 11 (Re)discovering Ground
- 12 Lewis’s Theories of Causation and Their Influence
- 13 Naturalism from the Mid-Twentieth Century to the Present
- 14 The History of Philosophy of Science
- 15 A Modern Synthesis of Philosophy and Biology
- Section Three Analytic Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy
- Section Four Analytic Aesthetics and Philosophy of Religion
- Part II Continental Philosophy
- Part III Bridge Builders, Border Crossers, Synthesizers, and Comparative Philosophy
- Part IV Epilogue: On the Philosophy of the History of Philosophy
- References
- Index
11 - (Re)discovering Ground
from Section Two - Logic, Metaphysics, Science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 November 2019
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Analytic Philosophy
- Section One Language, Mind, Epistemology
- Section Two Logic, Metaphysics, Science
- 10 Logic in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century
- 11 (Re)discovering Ground
- 12 Lewis’s Theories of Causation and Their Influence
- 13 Naturalism from the Mid-Twentieth Century to the Present
- 14 The History of Philosophy of Science
- 15 A Modern Synthesis of Philosophy and Biology
- Section Three Analytic Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy
- Section Four Analytic Aesthetics and Philosophy of Religion
- Part II Continental Philosophy
- Part III Bridge Builders, Border Crossers, Synthesizers, and Comparative Philosophy
- Part IV Epilogue: On the Philosophy of the History of Philosophy
- References
- Index
Summary
As different as these questions might be, they appear to have a similar form: They ask, in one way or another, whether some phenomenon determines another. Although this determination needn’t be causal in any usual sense, it is nevertheless usually taken to be or to back a kind of explanation: The determined phenomena hold in virtue of or because of the determining phenomena.
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- The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015 , pp. 147 - 159Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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