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68. - Feeling

from F

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Kristin Primus
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

The language of a mind “sensing” or “feeling” (sentire) can be found where Spinoza discusses the awareness a human mind has of changes to the human body: for instance, “we feel [sentimus] that a certain body [NS: our body] is affected in many ways” (E2a4). Yet a mind also senses modes of Thought and changes within its own thinking: for instance, “we neither feel [sentimus] nor perceive [percipimus] any singular things [NS: or anything of Natura naturata], except bodies and modes of thinking” (E2a5; cf. KV2n13, i/52).

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 176 - 178
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Barbone, S. (2017). Not just ‘an unmitigated and seemingly unmotivated disaster’: What could Spinoza mean by ‘sentimus experimurque, nos æternos esse’? International Philosophical Quarterly, 57(3), 305–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levy, L. (2021). Spinoza on ideas of affections. In Melamed, Y. (ed.), A Companion to Spinoza (pp. 286–95). Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Matson, W. (1990). Body essence and mind eternity in Spinoza. In Curley, E. and Moreau, P.-F. (eds.), Spinoza: Issues and Directions (pp. 82–95). Brill.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mignini, F. (1996). Sensus/sentatio in Spinoza. In Bianchi, M. L. (ed.), Sensus, Sensatio: VIII Colloquio Internazionale (pp. 267–96). Olschki.Google Scholar
Shapiro, L. (2012). How we experience the world: Passionate perception in Descartes and Spinoza. In Pickavé, M. and Shapiro, L. (eds.), Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy (pp. 193–216). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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