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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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  • I
  • Edited by Karolina Hübner, Cornell University, New York, Justin Steinberg, Cornell University, New York
  • Book: The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
  • Online publication: 09 January 2025
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  • I
  • Edited by Karolina Hübner, Cornell University, New York, Justin Steinberg, Cornell University, New York
  • Book: The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
  • Online publication: 09 January 2025
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  • I
  • Edited by Karolina Hübner, Cornell University, New York, Justin Steinberg, Cornell University, New York
  • Book: The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon
  • Online publication: 09 January 2025
Available formats
×