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155. - Quatenus

from Q

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Alexander Douglas
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

Quatenus is an adverb usually translated into English as “insofar as.” Spinoza uses the term at least 444 times in the Ethics (Lærke 2012, 261). Traditionally, it has been regarded as Spinoza’s contrivance for trying to wriggle out of metaphysical paradoxes generated by his system (Caird 1888, 166; W. James 1909, 47).

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 451 - 452
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Carriero, J. P. (1995). On the relationship between mode and substance in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 33(2), 245–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Curley, E. (2019). Spinoza’s metaphysics revisited. In Stetter, J. & Ramond, C. (eds.), Spinoza in Twenty-First-Century American and French Philosophy: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Moral and Political Philosophy (pp. 3–51). Bloomsbury.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Douglas, A. (2018). Quatenus and Spinoza’s Monism. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 56(2), 261–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lærke, M. (2012). ‘Deus quatenus’ … Sur l’emploi des particules réduplicatives dans l’Éthique. In Delbraccio, M., Moreau, P.-F., and Boulakia, C. Cohen (eds.), Lectures Contemporaines de Spinoza (pp. 165–85). Presses Universitaires de Paris-Sorbonne.Google Scholar
Lin, M. (2019). Being and Reason: An Essay on Spinoza’s Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Naess, A. (1981). Spinoza’s finite God. Revue internationale de philosophie, 35(135), 120–26.Google Scholar
Renz, U. (2018). The Explainability of Experience. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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