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156. - Reason

from R

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Michael LeBuffe
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

The common term “reason” (ratio) has several senses in Spinoza’s works. In metaphysics, Spinoza associates reasons with causes (E1p8s2, E1p11d2). In epistemology, Spinoza can associate reason broadly with knowledge. This use is prominent in the TTP, where Spinoza sets out to demonstrate that the free reasoning necessary for philosophy is not hampered by Scripture, which “leaves reason absolutely free and has nothing in common with philosophy” (TTPpref, see also E4p26–27, E4app4). This entry concerns a narrower, technical sense, in which reason is a particular kind of cognition and of knowledge.

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Chapter
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The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 455 - 457
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Curley, E. (1973). Spinoza’s moral philosophy. In Grene, M. (ed.), Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays (pp. 354–76). Notre Dame University Press.Google Scholar
Hübner, K. (2021). Spinoza on universals. In Melamed, Y. (ed.), A Companion to Spinoza (pp. 204–13). Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
LeBuffe, M. (2018). Spinoza on Reason. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Renz, U. (2018). The Explainability of Experience. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rutherford, D. (2008). Spinoza and the dictates of reason. Inquiry, 51(5), 485–511.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, M. (1996). Spinoza’s theory of knowledge. In Garrett, D. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza (pp. 89–141). Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

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