Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-l4dxg Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-15T11:14:11.970Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

167. - Singular Thing

from S

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
John Grey
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Get access

Summary

“Singular thing” (res singulares) is one of the terms Spinoza uses to denote finite particulars. The term figures prominently in most of his philosophical works (with the exception of the TTP, where it figures only briefly in the account of prophecy, and the TP, where the term goes unused). However, its precise meaning evolves from its earliest appearance in the TIE to its final appearance in the Ethics. In the Ethics, the definition of the term (i) stipulates that singular things are finite and (ii) specifies the conditions under which many things compose one singular thing. However, in Spinoza’s earlier writings, the term is not restricted to finite and mutable things, nor is it associated with the composition of one (singular) thing from many distinct things. This short entry traces those shifts in meaning.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 485 - 487
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Recommended Reading

Homan, M. (2021). Spinoza’s Epistemology through a Geometrical Lens. Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klein, J. (2002). “By eternity I understand”: Eternity according to Spinoza. Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 51, 295–324.Google Scholar
Wilson, M. (1996). Spinoza’s theory of knowledge. In Garrett, D. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza (pp. 89–141). Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×