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2 - “Now You Are Asking for a Real War!”

Private Alarm Systems in Norway*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 December 2024

Joseph E. Harrington Jr.
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
Maarten Pieter Schinkel
Affiliation:
Universiteit van Amsterdam
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Summary

  • The two major providers of private alarm systems in Norway engaged in a simple collusive market-sharing agreement made possible by a feature of this market. Market sharing pertained to door sales, which is a key marketing channel. Companies Sector and Verisure agreed to abstain from door sales to private homes marked with the rival company’s sign indicating it was providing home security services. A deviation from the agreement was detected by monitoring customer churn across the private alarm companies. There is no evidence the two companies coordinated on prices; they simply agreed not to poach each other’s customers using the door sales channel and thereby softened price competition.

  • Deviations from the collusive outcome arose from two different sources. One source was attributable to sales personnel who were not privy to the collusive arrangement. While high-level executives agreed not to poach customers and instructed sales personnel not to approach the homes served by a rival company, those sales agents periodically did not comply, presumably so as to meet their sales targets. The other source of deviation was attributable to the colluding executives. After the acquisition of a small rival company, there was a misunderstanding as to whether those new customers for the acquiring firm were part of the no-poaching agreement. While these deviations did lead to some retaliatory aggressiveness, the CEOs eventually resolved the matter and returned to their market-sharing arrangement.

Type
Chapter
Information
Cartels Diagnosed
New Insights on Collusion
, pp. 44 - 72
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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References

Asker, J., and Nocke, V. (2021) “Collusion, Mergers and Related Antitrust Issues,” in Ho, K, Hortacsu, A, and Lizzeri, A. eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 5, Elsevier, 177279.Google Scholar
Axelrod, R. (1980) “Effective Choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24(1), 325.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bos, I., and Harrington, J. E., Jr. (2010) “Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogenous Firms,” RAND Journal of Economics, 41(1), 92117.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Competition Appeal Tribunal (2021) “Decision letter to Verisure, November 25, 2021.” Konkurranseklagenemndas-vedtak-i-sak-2021-1051-Offentlig-versjon.pdf (klagenemndssekretariatet.no).Google Scholar
Fonseca, M. A., and Normann, H.-T (2012) “Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion: The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments,” European Economic Review, 56(8), 17591772.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harrington, J. E. Jr. (2018) “A Proposal for a Structural Remedy for Illegal Collusion,” Antitrust Law Journal, 82, 335.Google Scholar
Harrington, J. E. Jr. (2023) “The Practical Requirements of a Successful Cartel,” in Whelan, P. (ed.), Research Handbook on Cartels, Edward Elgar, 521.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tveit, S. T., and Solberg, S. O. (2019) “Minority Acquisitions under Merger Control Scrutiny in Norway: Key Learnings from the Recent Sector Alarm/Nokas Case,” Kluwer Competition Law Blog, July 19, 2019. competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2019/07/19/minority-acquisitions-under-merger-control-scrutiny-in-norway-key-learnings-from-the-recent-sector-alarmnokas-case/.Google Scholar

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