Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- PART I BACKGROUND
- PART II CHINA VS. THE UNITED STATES OVER TAIWAN
- PART III CHINA'S U.S. POLICY: TO AVOID A HEAD-ON COLLISION
- CHAPTER 5 ON A COLLISION COURSE
- CHAPTER 6 BARK WITHOUT BITE
- CHAPTER 7 TAIWAN AFTER THE FACE-OFF
- CHAPTER 8 CHINA AFTER THE FACE-OFF
- PART IV CONCLUSION
- Index
CHAPTER 7 - TAIWAN AFTER THE FACE-OFF
from PART III - CHINA'S U.S. POLICY: TO AVOID A HEAD-ON COLLISION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- PART I BACKGROUND
- PART II CHINA VS. THE UNITED STATES OVER TAIWAN
- PART III CHINA'S U.S. POLICY: TO AVOID A HEAD-ON COLLISION
- CHAPTER 5 ON A COLLISION COURSE
- CHAPTER 6 BARK WITHOUT BITE
- CHAPTER 7 TAIWAN AFTER THE FACE-OFF
- CHAPTER 8 CHINA AFTER THE FACE-OFF
- PART IV CONCLUSION
- Index
Summary
After the face-off between Beijing and Taipei in 1995, Lee took a tit-for-tat stance in defiance of China's mounting pressure, which, together with the changes in Taiwan's mainland policy, will be presented in this chapter. The rationale behind this stance will be discussed in Chapter 9.
“Go Nuclear”?
Lee's initial tit-for-tat reactions included the threat to “go nuclear”. Following China's harsh actions, the phrase “go nuclear” was spread around Taiwan. At one National Assembly session in late July 1995, the question was raised for Lee to clarify. Lee did not give a clear denial. He answered: “We should re-study the question (of acquiring nuclear weapons) from a long-term point of view”. This answer received a sharp response. The Taiwan government then quickly denied that it had any plan for developing nuclear weapons. Its explanation was that “What Mr. Lee meant by ‘long-term point of view’ was actually to give the matter further thought and discuss it later. In other words, it was an implicit way of saying ‘no’”.
This explanation was weak given the fact that Taiwan did have such a programme up until the late 1980s. Suspicions were aroused again following Lien Chan's secret visit to Ukraine in August 1996 when it was reported, although denied by Taiwan, that Lien discussed the nuclear issue with officials in Ukraine. The United States once forced Taiwan to drop the Pegasus Project for mid-range missiles out of the concern that Taiwan would initiate an offensive against China, as the U.S. deal with China was not to sell Taiwan offensive weapons that could hit the mainland. However, it was reported that Taiwan was on the verge of testing its mid-range surface-to-surface missiles. According to Taiwan's China Times, the range of the missile was 300 kilometres (186 miles), which would enable it to hit several coastal cities in China. According to Reuters, in late 1995, Taiwan was revising its domestically-made anti-aircraft Sky Bow II missile to a surface-to-surface missile with a target range of between 480 and 960 kilometres, enabling it to hit more of China's coastal cities and airports.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- China's DilemmaThe Taiwan Issue, pp. 130 - 155Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2001