Book contents
- The Collaborative Constitution
- Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law
- The Collaborative Constitution
- Copyright page
- Brief Contents
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Institutions and Interactions
- 1 Constitutionalism beyond Manicheanism
- 2 The Promise and Perils of Dialogue
- 3 The Case for Collaboration
- Part II Rights in Politics
- Part III Judge as Partner
- Part IV Responsive Legislatures
- Bibliography
- Index
- Books in the series
1 - Constitutionalism beyond Manicheanism
from Part I - Institutions and Interactions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 October 2023
- The Collaborative Constitution
- Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law
- The Collaborative Constitution
- Copyright page
- Brief Contents
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Institutions and Interactions
- 1 Constitutionalism beyond Manicheanism
- 2 The Promise and Perils of Dialogue
- 3 The Case for Collaboration
- Part II Rights in Politics
- Part III Judge as Partner
- Part IV Responsive Legislatures
- Bibliography
- Index
- Books in the series
Summary
This chapter explores the Manichean narrative between political and legal constitutionalism. Examining the rival arguments of Jeremy Waldron and Ronald Dworkin, this chapter argues that we need to move beyond Manicheanism in order to capture the multi-institutional modes of rights protection in contemporary constitutional democracies. It argues that both Dworkin and Waldron succumb to the nirvana fallacy, a fallacy we need to shake off if we are to devise realistic accounts of how the key institutions act, counteract, and interact in a constitutional democracy. The chapter also puts pressure on the notorious ’counter-majoritarian difficulty’, arguing that we need counter-majoritarian checks, not only in the name of rights, but in the name of democracy as well. This chapter defends the idea of ’mediated majoritarianism’. Finally, it turns to the ongoing schism between political versus legal constitutionalism in UK public law, arguing that it suffers from similar flaws to the broader Manichean narrative. Instead of a zero-sum game between courts and legislatures, the branches of government can interact in mutually respectful and supportive ways.
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- The Collaborative Constitution , pp. 31 - 57Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023