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3 - Measuring Corporate Political Responsibility

from Section I - Foundations of Corporate Political Responsibility: Metrics for Disclosure and Good Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 November 2023

By
Thomas P. Lyon  and
William Mandelkorn
Edited by
Thomas P. Lyon
Thomas P. Lyon
Affiliation:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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Summary

In this chapter, we examine the measurement issues that currently plague analysis of corporate political activity and that must be remedied for CPR to be credible, with a focus on the federal level. We begin with issues of electoral spending before turning to spending on lobbying. In each case, we survey the laws mandating disclosure of these activities, along with what some firms and third parties are doing to shed light on activities that fall outside these reporting requirements. We then discuss the questions that can be answered with existing data, and the important questions that are impossible to answer due to data gaps. Finally, we discuss changes to current laws, and to norms of corporate behavior, that could increase transparency and accountability around corporate political activity.

Keywords

Political spendingpolitical action committees (PACs)Super PACsindependent expenditurestrade associations501c4 groupspolitical engagement reportslobbyingdisclosure
Type
Chapter
Information
Corporate Political Responsibility , pp. 62 - 98
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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References

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