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Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2020

Zili Yang
Zili Yang
Affiliation:
State University of New York at Binghamton
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The Environment and Externality
Theory, Algorithms and Applications
 , pp. 277 - 285
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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  • Bibliography
  • Zili Yang, State University of New York at Binghamton
  • Book: The Environment and Externality
  • Online publication: 02 December 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108762557.009
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  • Bibliography
  • Zili Yang, State University of New York at Binghamton
  • Book: The Environment and Externality
  • Online publication: 02 December 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108762557.009
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  • Bibliography
  • Zili Yang, State University of New York at Binghamton
  • Book: The Environment and Externality
  • Online publication: 02 December 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108762557.009
Available formats
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