Conclusion

Summary

I have tried to do two things in this book. First, I have sought to examine the reasons why ethics is accorded such a marginal place within the discipline of international relations and to show that these reasons are not good ones. Second, I have put forward a substantive normative theory which I have dubbed constitutive theory. In seeking to achieve this latter objective I followed a model of argument first set out by Ronald Dworkin in the context of legal reasoning. This model of argument starts from the settled norms within a given domain of discourse and seeks, on the basis of these, to construct a background theory which will enable us to find solutions to hard cases. I started with a list of what most actors in international relations accept as settled norms and then sought to construct a background theory which would enable us to achieve a coherence between the different items on the list of settled goods. In the course of this attempt it was found that the following did not suffice as background theories: order-based theories, utilitarian theories and rights-based contract theories. The best background theory which emerged was a secularized Hegelian approach which I have called the constitutive theory of individuality.