Book contents
- The Failure of Popular Constitution Making in Turkey
- Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy
- The Failure of Popular Constitution Making in Turkey
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Contextualizing Constitution Making in Turkey
- Part III Debating and Drafting the Constitution in 2011–2013
- 5 Debating State Organization Principles in the Constitutional Conciliation Commission
- 6 Glass Half Full: Drafting Fundamental Rights in the Turkish Constitution-Making Process (2011–2013)
- 7 Countermajoritarian Institutions in Turkish Constitution Making
- 8 Debating the Amendment-Making Rule: The Rigidity vs. Flexibility Debate in the Turkish Constitution-Making Process
- Appendices
- Index
5 - Debating State Organization Principles in the Constitutional Conciliation Commission
from Part III - Debating and Drafting the Constitution in 2011–2013
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 December 2019
- The Failure of Popular Constitution Making in Turkey
- Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy
- The Failure of Popular Constitution Making in Turkey
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Contextualizing Constitution Making in Turkey
- Part III Debating and Drafting the Constitution in 2011–2013
- 5 Debating State Organization Principles in the Constitutional Conciliation Commission
- 6 Glass Half Full: Drafting Fundamental Rights in the Turkish Constitution-Making Process (2011–2013)
- 7 Countermajoritarian Institutions in Turkish Constitution Making
- 8 Debating the Amendment-Making Rule: The Rigidity vs. Flexibility Debate in the Turkish Constitution-Making Process
- Appendices
- Index
Summary
This chapter focuses on the debates over fundamental principles of state organization that took place in the Constitutional Conciliation Commission ‘Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu, AUK’ during Turkey’s 2011–2013 constitution-making process. It discusses the failure of popular constitution making as well as the most recent constitutional changes in the context of a tradition of statist, authoritarian constitutionalism in Turkey. We assess the extent to which disagreements over the fundamental nature of principles of state organization contributed to the failure of popular constitution making in 2013. Our inquiry shows that the diverging conceptions of democracy, separation of powers, and the rule of law of the different parties involved led to extreme tensions. Deep disagreements over these issues and others made compromise impossible. Therefore, the contested subjects subsumed under the principles of state organization contributed significantly to the failure of popular constitution making in Turkey, and cleared the path to majority imposition by the ruling party in subsequent constitution-making and amendment processes.
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- The Failure of Popular Constitution Making in TurkeyRegressing Towards Constitutional Autocracy, pp. 145 - 182Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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