Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-hc48f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T21:03:45.885Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - The separation of the psychological from the logical

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Wolfgang Carl
Affiliation:
Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen, Germany
Get access

Summary

In the preface to The Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege states three principles that, though well known, are not properly understood, because they are considered in isolation. These principles constitute the very kernel of his philosophical views before his discovery of the distinction between sense and reference and are connected with each other. An account of their relationship will reveal how his criticism of psychologism is related to his concerns with the meaning of linguistic expressions and with the logical analysis of thoughts. In this way one will realise the distinctive philosophical nature of the various achievements brought about by Frege before 1890.

The first principle laid down by Frege in The Foundations states that “one has to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective”. What does he mean by this? Is it an invitation to draw one distinction or is he concerned with two distinctions? And if with two, how are they connected? To answer these questions one has to consider why and how the distinction between the psychological and the logical is to be made. As we have seen, this distinction is supposed to be not between two different kinds of things but between two different ways of looking at one and the same thing. What particular properties one can isolate are determined by the complex character of our actual thinking, which as it “naturally develops” or “takes place”, has two different kinds of properties, called “logical” and “psychological”.

Type
Chapter
Information
Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference
Its Origin and Scope
, pp. 26 - 52
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1994

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×