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3 - Jacobi on the Nature of Mind and Intuitive Certainty

from Part I - The Critique of Reason: Debates on Rationalism, Empiricism, and Skepticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2023

Alexander J. B. Hampton
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Summary

This chapter considers how Jacobi’s philosophy of mind distinguishes itself by ascribing a resolutely realist intuition to sensibility, the intellect, and reason. The key to this difference is Jacobi’s personalism, or self-feeling – an awareness of the finite nature of one’s existence – which reveals itself as an unmediated, pre-discursive, non-sensuous actuality.

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Chapter
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Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and the Ends of the Enlightenment
Religion, Philosophy, and Reason at the Crux of Modernity
, pp. 49 - 65
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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References

Bowman, Brady. “Notiones Communes und Common Sense: Zu den Spinozanischen Voraussetzungen von Jacobis Rezeption der Philosophie Thomas Reids.” In Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: Ein Wendepunkt der geistigen Bildung der Zeit. Edited by Jaeschke, Walter and Sandkaulen, Birgit, 159–76. Hamburg: Meiner, 2004.Google Scholar
Di Giovanni, George. “Hume, Jacobi, and Common Sense: An Episode in the Reception of Hume in Germany at the Time of Kant.” Kant-Studien 89 (1998): 44–58.Google Scholar
Frank, Manfred. Selbstgefühl: Eine historisch-systematische Erkundung. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002.Google Scholar
Hume, David. Enquiry concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited by Nidditch, P. H.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hume, David. Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by Selby-Bigge, Lewis Amherst. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.Google ScholarGoogle Scholar
McDowell, John. “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument.” In Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Edited by Haddock, Adrian and Macpherson, Fiona. 376–89. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.Google Scholar
Sandkaulen, Birgit. Jacobis Philosophie: Über den Widerspruch zwischen System und Freiheit. Hamburg: Meiner, 2019.Google Scholar
Spinoza, Baruch de. Collected Works. Edited by Curley, Edwin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.Google Scholar

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