Chapter 14 - Epilogue: The Bali Bombing and Responses to International Terrorism

Summary

Introduction

On 12 October 2002 a bomb blast destroyed the Sari Club in Bali, resulting in almost 200 deaths, including around 100 Australian tourists to the fabled holiday island. This attack was the single most devastating terrorist attack since the infamous 11 September attacks against targets on the American mainland. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack in Bali, but even before all the evidence is gathered, it is probably not premature to assume that a radical Islamist group was behind it. A threat by Osama bin Laden to Australia in late 2001,1 due to Australia's involvement in East Timor, adds strongly to the suspicion that Al-Qaeda was behind the attack. Discussions about Southeast Asia as the “second front” in the global war on terrorism by Western officials and media sources have generally been rejected as alarmist by the Indonesian Government itself. Does the Bali blast signal that Indonesia is now a home for terrorism linked to Al-Qaeda? In a sense Indonesia's denial of the presence of an international terrorist element within its borders, and its resulting failure to act against it, has been dramatically undermined by the bombing. Although it remains unknown exactly who planted the bomb, and for what purpose, the Bali explosion has a number of ramifications for Indonesia. A statement by the Indonesian Government that this was the work of Al-Qaeda is an important turning point as it is an admission that Indonesia may be home to a radical fringe. The Bali blast will change, irrevocably, the image of Southeast Asia as a potential home to Islamic radicalism. While the majority of Indonesia's Muslims have demonstrated a commitment to either a secular state or moderate forms of Islamic governance, there exists a tiny minority element that seems sympathetic to Al-Qaeda's goals.

Outside of the immediate threat of violence, it seems unlikely that radical versions of political Islam can seize political power through legitimate political processes (refer to Azyumardi Azra's chapter in this volume).