Book contents
- Hitler’s Fatal Miscalculation
- Cambridge Military Histories
- Hitler’s Fatal Miscalculation
- Copyright page
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations and German and Russian Terms
- Introduction
- 1 Hitler’s Pre-War Assessment of the United States and Japan
- 2 Hitler’s Physical Health in Autumn 1941
- 3 ‘All Measures Short of War’: the German Assessment of American Strategy, 1940–1941
- 4 Forging an Unlikely Alliance: Germany and Japan, 1933–1941
- 5 Facing the Same Dilemma: the US and German Quest for Rubber
- 6 The Crisis of the German War Economy, 1940–1941
- 7 The End of Blitzkrieg? Barbarossa and the Impact of Lend-Lease
- 8 The Battle of the Atlantic
- 9 The Luftwaffe on the Eve of Global War
- 10 The Holocaust
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - The Holocaust
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2021
- Hitler’s Fatal Miscalculation
- Cambridge Military Histories
- Hitler’s Fatal Miscalculation
- Copyright page
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Figures
- Maps
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations and German and Russian Terms
- Introduction
- 1 Hitler’s Pre-War Assessment of the United States and Japan
- 2 Hitler’s Physical Health in Autumn 1941
- 3 ‘All Measures Short of War’: the German Assessment of American Strategy, 1940–1941
- 4 Forging an Unlikely Alliance: Germany and Japan, 1933–1941
- 5 Facing the Same Dilemma: the US and German Quest for Rubber
- 6 The Crisis of the German War Economy, 1940–1941
- 7 The End of Blitzkrieg? Barbarossa and the Impact of Lend-Lease
- 8 The Battle of the Atlantic
- 9 The Luftwaffe on the Eve of Global War
- 10 The Holocaust
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Many historians have alleged – or strongly implied - that the days of late November/December 1941 witnessed an escalation of the Shoa from localised ethnic cleansing to genocide on a continental scale on account of the outbreak of US-German hostilities. According to this theory, Hitler managed to convince himself that the war was militarily lost by virtue of the Red Army’s winter offensive and/or the US entry into the war and hence, decided to prioritise the mass murder of his (perceived) domestic enemies. Antisemitism pure and simple is seen as the key driver. This theory is problematic to say the least, since the situation outside Moscow would not come to be regarded as critical before mid-December.
I have concluded that the decision for the Shoah had almost certainly been made by late November and that there is indeed evidence which points to this being influenced by the assessment of imminent US-German hostilities. Crucially, however, it was put on hold for about a fortnight when the Germans arrived at the mistaken impression that Japan would not join them in hostilities. Antisemitism may have been important but was still trumped by strategic calculation.
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- Hitler's Fatal MiscalculationWhy Germany Declared War on the United States, pp. 523 - 542Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021