Chapter 13 - Reflections on François Recanati's ‘Immunity to error through misidentification: what it is and where it comes from’

Summary

The first reminder is that immune to error through misidentification (IEM) is not a universal feature of I-thought. There are evidential circumstances in which particular thoughts about oneself are not immune to error through misidentification. The second reminder is that it is incorrect to suppose that IEM I-thoughts are restricted to the psychological, to what can be conveyed by an avowal, in Rylean terminology: a self-ascription of mental states and goings-on. A large class avowals are not merely immune to error through misidentification but also immune to error through mispredication. One kind of error of mispredication is made possible when a predicate is properly but defeasibly applicable on the basis of the application of another. One might predicate "green" of an object on the basis of the predicability of "looks green" to it. The former might then be defeated by considerations concerning abnormal lighting or some color illusion.