Introduction

Summary

The end of the Cold War and the almost simultaneous advent of globalization with its emphasis on market forces, capital and technology were landmark changes. Old mindsets were giving way to new equations. In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateralism was being tried as a means to deal with interstate issues, and major powers were evaluating if and how they should adopt it. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, India remained isolated and marginalized, even in its neighbourhood. But, fortunately, there were some windows of fresh opportunities opening up. This was the time when both India and countries of Southeast Asia, principally Singapore, discerned on the horizon an opening of promise in the otherwise cloudy skies between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). India was not unaware of the economically reforming China, which had by that time normalized relations with ASEAN states. In diplomacy, the timing of an action is undoubtedly very vital. A timely opportunity lost might not present itself again. It was fortuitous that the leaderships in India and Southeast Asia seized that opportunity. In fact, some measure of confidence-building had been undertaken by the two sides from the mid-1980s. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visits to Myanmar and Indonesia had prepared a helpful ground. His visit to China in 1988 marked a milestone in Sino-Indian relations. During the visit, Deng Xiaoping and Rajiv Gandhi foresaw a fresh and pragmatic perspective for the two countries in time to come.

Since the early 1990s, a new and absorbing chapter in India's engagement with Southeast Asia is being written. It might have appeared to international observers as just another diplomatic interaction among neighbours. Even within India, it was seen only as a part of India's opening process after the end of the Cold War. But it was much more than that. It was in Southeast Asia where India saw the first signs of a positive and successful resonance to the pragmatic policy framework adopted by both sides.