Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Graphs
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Research Framework
- 3 The Electoral Accountability Dimension
- 4 The Vertical Accountability Dimension
- 5 The Horizontal Accountability Dimension
- 6 The Consequences of Institutional Engineering
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- List of Interviews
- Index
- About the Author
6 - The Consequences of Institutional Engineering
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 May 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Graphs
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Research Framework
- 3 The Electoral Accountability Dimension
- 4 The Vertical Accountability Dimension
- 5 The Horizontal Accountability Dimension
- 6 The Consequences of Institutional Engineering
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- List of Interviews
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
In the previous chapters I analysed institutional reforms in regards to the three dimensions of accountability in the three countries under research. In this chapter I will give a comparative analysis of the impact these institutional reforms have had on the quality of democracy.
Reforms on Electoral Accountability and their Impact on Democratization: A Comparative Perspective
There were few institutional reforms concerning the presidential elections in the two presidential systems of the Philippines and Indonesia. In the Philippines, the electoral system has not been altered since it was inaugurated in the 1987 Constitution. It has retained problematic features, such as the non-requirement of an absolute majority in a single round and the missing possibility for re-election of an incumbent president. In contrast, the Indonesian president enjoys much higher legitimacy than his Philippine counterpart due to an electoral process that is in accordance with an amended constitution, which contributes to the stabilization of the democratization process. The absolute majority of the votes, which is required in Indonesia and made possible by run-off elections, guarantees that at least half of the voters supported the winning candidate. The possibility for a single re-election in Indonesia holds the president under the judgement of the general public for his or her first term. If the president performs well in the eyes of the electorate he or she can hope for another five-year term. This scenario, which occurred with President SBY in 2009, is generally not possible in the Philippines. In terms of electoral accountability, Philippine presidential elections are thus a prospective rather than retrospective measure. Here, the president is a “lame duck”, beholden to all the negative consequences from the first day in office. The re-election of an incumbent president in 2004 was an unusual exception to the rule, and in terms of constitutionality very controversial.
The nomination process for presidential candidates is another remarkable difference between the two countries. In the Philippines, every naturalborn citizen who is literate and at least forty years of age (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 2) can run for the presidency. In Indonesia, access is more restricted. There, candidates for the presidency can only be nominated by political parties represented in the House of Representatives (DPR). The only major institutional reform that changed the mode of presidential elections concerned the required percentage of votes and seats for a presidential nomination.
- Type
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- Information
- Institutional Engineering and Political Accountability in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines , pp. 220 - 240Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2014