Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Graphs
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Research Framework
- 3 The Electoral Accountability Dimension
- 4 The Vertical Accountability Dimension
- 5 The Horizontal Accountability Dimension
- 6 The Consequences of Institutional Engineering
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- List of Interviews
- Index
- About the Author
3 - The Electoral Accountability Dimension
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 May 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Graphs
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Research Framework
- 3 The Electoral Accountability Dimension
- 4 The Vertical Accountability Dimension
- 5 The Horizontal Accountability Dimension
- 6 The Consequences of Institutional Engineering
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- List of Interviews
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
As has been described in chapter 2.4 institutional reforms concerning electoral accountability are very important in order to analyse the progress of democratic deepening in a political system. In the following, I will apply the criteria from chapter 2.4 to draw conclusions on the democratization processes in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines and will proceed in this order. Starting with Thailand, I will illustrate and analyse major features of the post-founding elections. In a next step, I will then take a closer look at processes of institutional engineering and assess institutional changes concerning the electoral accountability of the national parliament and the second chamber. Finally, I will present and discuss reforms concerning political parties and their contribution to electoral accountability. The same structure and proceeding will be applied in chapters 3.2 to Indonesia and 3.3 to the Philippines.
THAILAND
The 1997 Constitution
Thai electoral regulations are usually very closely defined in their respective constitutions. Since the transition from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional one in 1932, Thailand has been able to maintain a constitution for more than ten years only between 1932 and 1946. Frequent changes were made due to the numerous coups the country witnessed. As every new regime wanted to create a system of government that suited its own vision, a plethora of constitutions was decided upon. The constitution became a tool of those in power only to be replaced when power switched hands. In other words, Thai constitutions “have functioned as mere political documents serving the interests of the executive branch” (Klein 1998, p. 17), or rather that of the coup plotters.
Some constitutional principles remained untouched, however. The King's role as head of state in the constitutional monarchy was never questioned, as well as the corresponding parliamentary system with a prime minister as head of government. The 1997 Constitution differed from the previous fifteen in that it was drafted as a part of the democratization process by a representatively composed Constitutional Drafting Assembly instead of being drafted by the ruling powers. Hence, it was commonly called the “People's Constitution” and generally regarded as the most democratic constitution Thailand had ever seen. Some Western observers were even convinced that “the 1997 Constitution represents a revolution in Thai politics. It was a bold attempt at conferring greater power to the Thai people than had ever been granted before.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Institutional Engineering and Political Accountability in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines , pp. 69 - 126Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2014