5 - The Horizontal Accountability Dimension

Summary

In this chapter, I will analyse how institutional changes concerning mechanisms of horizontal accountability affected the quality of democracy in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. As described in chapter 2.6, horizontal accountability refers to a system of “checks and balances” between the different state institutions. This particularly applies to the accountability of the elected government vis-à-visthe other branches of government.

In the following I will analyse what kind of institutional reforms concerning the dimension of horizontal accountability took place in the three countries under research. Executive-legislative relations will be the first aspect, followed by the executive-judiciary relations. Finally I will analyse how independent watch-dog organizations, such as counter-corruption commissions, audit agencies, and election commissions were effective in exerting control over government actions. As in the previous chapters, I will start with Thailand and then continue with Indonesia and the Philippines.

THAILAND

Executive-Legislative Relations

The 1997 Constitution aimed to raise the institutional stability of the political system. A separation of powers, as described in chapter 2.6, is quite different in a parliamentary system, as the separation of powers between executive and legislative does not occur between government and parliament, but rather between the cabinet including its supporting parliamentary majority and the minority/opposition in parliament. In such a parliamentary system, the opposition in the parliament, a possible second chamber, an independent judiciary, and independent watch-dog organizations are possible institutions that might keep the government in check.

The drafters of the 1997 Constitution attempted to strengthen the executive power for stable governments and at the same time provide checks and balances to control governmental actions. The position of the prime minister was strengthened in comparison to previous constitutions in order to provide more political stability. The prime minister presided over the dominant coalition majority in the House of Representatives, was allowed to select the cabinet independently and without consent of any other institution, and had the right to dissolve the legislature.

Michael Nelson argued that

the 100 party list seats introduced with the 1997 Constitution were notably not aimed at providing access to underrepresented political forces. Rather, the intention was… to enable supposedly better qualified personnel to govern the country and strengthen the hand of the prime minister over them (Nelson 2007, p. 11).

The latter target was also reached by other electoral reforms in the 1997 Constitution.