Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Tables
- Foreword
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Glossary
- Introduction
- 1 The Waning of the Masyumi Tradition
- 2 The “Muslim Nation” Dogma
- 3 Shari'ah Concerns, Motives, and Qualities
- 4 Vote Maximization: Islamist Electoral Strategies
- 5 The Triumph of Political Logic
- Conclusion
- Postscript: “Muslim Nation” Dogma and Pancasila Holdovers
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
5 - The Triumph of Political Logic
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Tables
- Foreword
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Glossary
- Introduction
- 1 The Waning of the Masyumi Tradition
- 2 The “Muslim Nation” Dogma
- 3 Shari'ah Concerns, Motives, and Qualities
- 4 Vote Maximization: Islamist Electoral Strategies
- 5 The Triumph of Political Logic
- Conclusion
- Postscript: “Muslim Nation” Dogma and Pancasila Holdovers
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
In 1998, demokrasi had brought about the long-awaited opportunity for Islamist parties to regain political power. The most fundamental challenge Islamists faced in the following months and years was to find a balance between promoting religious ideology and making the most of the chances provided by power politics. In this chapter, I will continue to stress that, ultimately, the achievement of political goals was of more immediate relevance than ideological ideals. This being constitutional Islamism, the practical imperative often came about as a consequence of political participation. This is thus different to a number of other Muslim-majority countries, perhaps nowhere more manifest than in Saudi Arabia, where the application of shari'ah has not been framed by constitutional confines.
The pragmatic Islamist imperative was illustrated by their shifting support for presidential candidates from various ideological backgrounds. The Islamist parties’ recognition of ideologically opposed governments again underlined their strong constitutionalism. Their willingness to support contenders for the presidency to whom they were ideologically opposed, was at the same time, coupled to the latter's willingness to give Islamist MPs powerful positions in their cabinets. Short-term goals were thus of more urgent importance than long-term goals — a matter Islamists often explained with the predominance of constitutional rulings over ideological principles.
As Islamist parties were strongly opposed to Megawati's Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (“Indonesian Democratic Party–Struggle”, PDIP), they wanted to diminish that party's chances of winning the election and securing the presidency for Megawati Soekarnoputri. In the circumstances of 1998 and 1999, Islamist parties saw Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (“Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals”, ICMI) chairman and Soeharto's last deputy, Habibie, as their best chance in the presidential race. When Habibie's prospects dimmed, however, Islamist parties shifted their support behind Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (“National Awakening Party”, PKB) Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid to thwart Megawati's bid for the presidency. Despite this, these parties later depicted Abdurrahman's presidency as a failure and worked to bring about his downfall. In early 2001, parliament set up a commission to investigate Abdurrahman's alleged mishandling of public funds.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Islamism in IndonesiaPolitics in the Emerging Democracy, pp. 264 - 320Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2009