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32 - Approaches to Multilevel Models of Fear: The What, Where, Why, How, and How Much?

from Section 11

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2020

By
Kenneth F. Schaffner
Edited by
Kenneth S. Kendler ,
Josef Parnas  and
Peter Zachar
Kenneth S. Kendler
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University
Josef Parnas
Affiliation:
University of Copenhagen
Peter Zachar
Affiliation:
Auburn University, Montgomery
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Summary

When we talk of “levels,” these can variously be levels of abstraction, analysis, aggregation, and behavior, as well as description and explanation, and more. Several of these differing approaches to levels are defined and exemplified, and then explored in connection with fear and anxiety disorders. Here I focus on the provocative suggestion of LeDoux and Pine that a second level or perspective (in their “two-system model”) is also needed – one involving phenomenological consciousness of fear in humans. I also argue for a “thin attention” theory of consciousness, but one embedded in a variant of Dehaene’s Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) theory. In addition, I sketch an analysis of the “self,” relevant to the two-system model, which builds on the Alternative Model of Personality Disorders (AMPD) to be found in Section III of the DSM-5.

Keywords

FearAnxietySelfConsciousnessEmotionTwo-system modelLevelsAMPD
Type
Chapter
Information
Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives
 , pp. 384 - 409
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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