Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 ‘MM's Strategy, Goh Chok Tong's Stamina’
- 2 Chinatown Spelt ‘Singapur’
- 3 Asia's ‘Coca-Cola Governments’
- 4 ‘An Absolute Pariah in the Whole World’
- 5 India's ‘Monroe Doctrine for Asia’
- 6 ‘India Alone Can Look China in the Eye’
- 7 Goh's Folly to Goh's Glory with Tata
- 8 ‘The Lowest Point in Bilateral Relations’
- 9 ‘Scent of the S'pore Dollar’
- 10 Singapore's ‘Mild India Fever’
- 11 End of One Honeymoon, Start of Another?
- 12 Shaping the Asian Century
- Notes
- Index
8 - ‘The Lowest Point in Bilateral Relations’
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 ‘MM's Strategy, Goh Chok Tong's Stamina’
- 2 Chinatown Spelt ‘Singapur’
- 3 Asia's ‘Coca-Cola Governments’
- 4 ‘An Absolute Pariah in the Whole World’
- 5 India's ‘Monroe Doctrine for Asia’
- 6 ‘India Alone Can Look China in the Eye’
- 7 Goh's Folly to Goh's Glory with Tata
- 8 ‘The Lowest Point in Bilateral Relations’
- 9 ‘Scent of the S'pore Dollar’
- 10 Singapore's ‘Mild India Fever’
- 11 End of One Honeymoon, Start of Another?
- 12 Shaping the Asian Century
- Notes
- Index
Summary
Asean linked the Vietnam–Cambodia controversy to its perceptions of Soviet aims in Asia. India saw it in terms of China which supported an increasingly Islamized and unstable Pakistan with, in Lee's view, a ‘visceral’ hatred of India. He does not think China will ever give up on Pakistan just as he does not think Pakistanis need Chinese encouragement to mount terrorist attacks against India. India–Singapore relations were further bedevilled by reports of clandestine traffic in men and merchandise but Cambodia remained the major headache, with Lee's philosophical understanding of Indira Gandhi's motives not affecting sharp exchanges at lower levels.
No other South-east Asian government was as strident as Singapore in lobbying against Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Singapore's superior debating skill and command of English was one reason, but Singapore was also staunchly pro-Western. Malaysia was less anti-Soviet, and Brajesh Mishra does not think Indonesia, which was deeply suspicious of China, joined the campaign at all. But Singapore was relieved when Indira Gandhi seemed in no hurry to redeem her promise to recognize Heng Samrin, and took the lead in acting on India's pending memorandum to Asean. The result was a meeting of officials—the first of its kind—four months after Indira Gandhi's return to power when Asean Secretary-General Ali bin Abdullah and the five regional representatives met with a senior Indian diplomat, Eric Gonsalves, in Kuala Lumpur in May. The calm did not last long, and Rajaratnam's high-pitched rhetoric and the fervent advocacy of an MFA booklet, From Phnom Penh to Kabul, were continued in another Singapore publication denouncing the Havana summit as the ‘lowest point of degradation’, and melodramatically asking India to rescue NAM ‘from the brothel area into which it had wandered.’
Then followed the fiasco of Asean's thirteenth ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 25–26 June, to which India was invited. A patronizing press release ‘noted with satisfaction that Asean has expanded its dialogue to include developing countries as evidenced in the start of the Asean-India Dialogue’. Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja also announced that Asean was engaging in its first dialogue with a developing country.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Looking East to Look WestLee Kuan Yew's Mission India, pp. 212 - 238Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2009