Chapter twelve - Conclusion: the end of the Emergency (1957–60)

Summary

This concluding chapter falls into two distinct parts. The first section analyses the experiences of the Special Branch as Britain prepared for the transfer of power to an independent Malayan government in 1957. Special attention was paid to the role the Special Branch was to play in an independent Malaya. As independence approached, and with it the concomitant improvement in the security situation, the Malayanisation of the public service, including the Special Branch, became one of the main platforms of the Malayan National Alliance, the party in power, consisting of the United Malays National Organisation, the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Malayan Indian Congress. In preparation for the envisaged changes, the recruitment of expatriates was wound down and questions about the long-term functions of the Special Branch as a regional training hub were raised. Throughout this period (1956–58), both the British and the independent government continued to put down the remaining insurgents, although by now they constituted remnants rather than a major challenge. This chapter also looks at the last major counterinsurgency operation of the Emergency in which the Special Branch played a significant part, code-named Operation Ginger, that was launched in central Perak in February 1958 and lasted until April 1959.

The second part of this conclusion reflects on the key factors that characterised the evolution of the Special Branch and its successful response to the Malayan Emergency. It is interesting to note that as the current situation in Iraq's internal affairs increasingly spins out of control, a growing number of references have been made to the failed American intervention in Vietnam and the successful British and Malayan interventions during the First Malayan Insurgency. The most recent reference at the time of completing this study was made by the Governor-General of Australia, Major General Michael Jeffery, who commented that the difficulties in countering ‘the predictable insurgency’ that followed the fall of Baghdad in March 2003 ‘should encourage us all to revisit the appropriate lessons from the Malayan and Vietnam campaigns’. In his address to a Chief of Army conference dinner in Canberra on 22 September 2005, General Jeffery said that HUMINT and large-numbers of well-trained troops and police were essential ingredients for success in fighting an insurgency.