Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- About the Author
- Foreword by Anthony Short
- Contents
- List of tables and charts
- Map of Malaya 1948
- Acknowledgments
- Prologue
- Chapter one The nature of the Malayan Emergency
- Chapter two The Malayan Security Service and the evolution of the Special Branch
- Chapter three The Special Branch takes over (1948–49)
- Chapter four The principles of intelligence collection
- Chapter five Agents of change (1949–52)
- Chapter six The rise of the Special Branch (1950–52): Sir William Jenkin
- Chapter seven The Special Branch and the Briggs Plan
- Chapter eight General Templer, Colonel Young and the Special Branch: the implementation of the Briggs Plan
- Chapter nine The Special Branch comes of age (1952–56)
- Chapter ten ‘The weather has been horrible’—the Special Branch and communist communications: a case study
- Chapter eleven The Special Branch on the Malayan–Thai frontier (1948–60): a case study
- Chapter twelve Conclusion: the end of the Emergency (1957–60)
- Abbreviations, acronyms and glossary
- Note on transliteration
- Bibliography
- Index
- Plate section
Chapter three - The Special Branch takes over (1948–49)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- About the Author
- Foreword by Anthony Short
- Contents
- List of tables and charts
- Map of Malaya 1948
- Acknowledgments
- Prologue
- Chapter one The nature of the Malayan Emergency
- Chapter two The Malayan Security Service and the evolution of the Special Branch
- Chapter three The Special Branch takes over (1948–49)
- Chapter four The principles of intelligence collection
- Chapter five Agents of change (1949–52)
- Chapter six The rise of the Special Branch (1950–52): Sir William Jenkin
- Chapter seven The Special Branch and the Briggs Plan
- Chapter eight General Templer, Colonel Young and the Special Branch: the implementation of the Briggs Plan
- Chapter nine The Special Branch comes of age (1952–56)
- Chapter ten ‘The weather has been horrible’—the Special Branch and communist communications: a case study
- Chapter eleven The Special Branch on the Malayan–Thai frontier (1948–60): a case study
- Chapter twelve Conclusion: the end of the Emergency (1957–60)
- Abbreviations, acronyms and glossary
- Note on transliteration
- Bibliography
- Index
- Plate section
Summary
The Malayan Special Branch found itself at a considerable disadvantage in taking over responsibility for political, security and operational intelligence at such short notice from the Malayan Security Service. Though the Special Branch absorbed most of the former Malayan Security Service personnel based in Malaya, it was still under-strength in the first few years of the Emergency. As related in the preceding chapter, the MSS itself was under-strength when it handed over its functions to the Malayan and Singapore Special Branches, and in Malaya Lieutenant Colonel Dalley had to arrange, at least temporarily, for the local police CIDs in the territories of Pahang, Malacca, Kelantan and Trengganu to cover political and security intelligence on behalf the MSS. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that at the beginning of the Emergency, the Special Branch was criticised by the higher echelons of the military and the civil administration for its perceived unpreparedness and slowness in providing operational intelligence. In many cases, handwritten and cyclostyled communist documents recovered from communist camps or found in the possession of captured or dead communist insurgents were discarded as being of little more than routine value and not afforded the importance they deserved. From the evidence available, it would seem there was some validity to the criticisms. One of the reasons for the jam of documents was, of course, that the Special Branch was under-staffed and simply unable to cope with the backlog of documents awaiting translation. The MSS may have inadvertently contributed to this state of affairs by handing over a large backlog of communist documents awaiting translation to the Special Branch in August 1948. In Dalley's letter of 13 July 1948 to Sir Ralph Hone, for instance, he admitted the MSS had a considerable accumulation of communist documents awaiting translation because of an acute shortage of translators and supporting office staff (Chapter 2).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Malaya's Secret Police 1945–60The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency, pp. 59 - 78Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2008