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5 - Means

How Governors Shape Budgetary Outcomes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 April 2024

Christian Breunig
Affiliation:
Universität Konstanz, Germany
Chris Koski
Affiliation:
Reed College, Oregon
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Summary

American governors have specific means – veto and agenda-setting powers – for shaping public budgets. Governors face competing managerial and political pressures when constructing a budget: forces of legislatures, agencies, and parties that demand changes in individual categories contending with the need to deliver the budget as a whole. In addition to managing these competing interests, governors also have their own preferences they wish to express in the budget. This chapter shows how the institutional strength of governors affects their ability to reign in competing demands. Our quantitative analysis shows that governors with stronger powers can make large cuts and raises in budgets even larger: a finding we term “bottoming-out” and “topping-off.” This mechanism has significant consequences for the budget as a whole: Disruptions in spending lead to slower long-term budget growth overall. Hence, executive power leads to less stable policymaking, particularly in instable interest group environments.

Type
Chapter
Information
Means, Motives, and Opportunities
How Executives and Interest Groups Set Public Policy
, pp. 142 - 174
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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  • Means
  • Christian Breunig, Universität Konstanz, Germany, Chris Koski, Reed College, Oregon
  • Book: Means, Motives, and Opportunities
  • Online publication: 11 April 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009428583.007
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  • Means
  • Christian Breunig, Universität Konstanz, Germany, Chris Koski, Reed College, Oregon
  • Book: Means, Motives, and Opportunities
  • Online publication: 11 April 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009428583.007
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Means
  • Christian Breunig, Universität Konstanz, Germany, Chris Koski, Reed College, Oregon
  • Book: Means, Motives, and Opportunities
  • Online publication: 11 April 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009428583.007
Available formats
×