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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2009

Jane Heal
Jane Heal
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St John's College, Cambridge
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Mind, Reason and Imagination
Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language
 , pp. 289 - 296
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

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References

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Dennett, D. 1982. Making Sense of Ourselves. In J. I. Biro and R. W. Shahan, eds., Mind, Brain and Function, 63–81. Brighton: Harvester Press. Reprinted with an appendix in his The Intentional Stance, 83–116. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987
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Dennett, D. 1987a. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
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Dilthey, W. 1976. Selected Writings, ed. H. P. Rickman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Dreyfus, H. L., and Dreyfus, S. 1986. Mind over Machine. New York: Free Press, Macmillan
Dummett, M. 1975. What Is a Theory of Meaning? In S. Guttenplan, ed., Mind and Language. Oxford University Press
Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Evans, G. 1985. Pronouns, Quantifiers and Relative Clauses (I). In his Collected Papers, 76–152. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Field, H. 1977. Logic, Meaning and Conceptual Role. The Journal of Philosophy 74:379–409Google Scholar
Field, H. 1978. Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13:9–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Fodor, J. A. 1987. Psychosemantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
Fodor, J., and Lepore, E. 1992. Holism: A Shopper's Guide. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Forbes, G. 1993. Solving the Iteration Problem. Linguistics and Philosophy 16: 311–330CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fricker, E. 1998. Self-Knowledge: Special Access versus Artefact of Grammar – A Dichotomy Rejected. In C. Wright, B. Smith and C. Macdonald, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds, 155–206. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Fuller, G. 1995. Simulation and Psychological Concepts. In M. Davies and T. Stone, eds., Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications, 19–32. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Givon, T. 1980. The Binding Hierarchy and the Typology of Complements. Studies in Language 4:333–377CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. 1995a. Interpretation Psychologised. In M. Davies and T. Stone, eds., Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate, 74–99. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Goldman, A. 1995b: In Defence of the Simulation Theory. In M. Davies and T. Stone, eds., Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate, 191–206. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Goldman, A. 2000a. Folk Psychology and Mental Concepts. Protosociology 14:4–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. 2000b. The Mentalizing Folk. In D. Sperber, ed., Metarepresentation. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Gombay, A. 1988. Some Paradoxes of Counterprivacy. Philosophy 63:191–210CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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  • References
  • Jane Heal, St John's College, Cambridge
  • Book: Mind, Reason and Imagination
  • Online publication: 18 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615894.017
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  • References
  • Jane Heal, St John's College, Cambridge
  • Book: Mind, Reason and Imagination
  • Online publication: 18 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615894.017
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  • References
  • Jane Heal, St John's College, Cambridge
  • Book: Mind, Reason and Imagination
  • Online publication: 18 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615894.017
Available formats
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