11 - Conclusion

Summary

Thus far, the anti-sweatshop movement has not been particularly successful in getting their favored policies mandated. Sociologist and activist Jill Esbenshade summarizes the progress of the movement as of 2004: “Although this movement has brought the issue of sweatshops into the consuming public’s eye, it has had considerably less success in translating this heightened concern into victories for garment workers in their factories.” Seven years later, the situation was not much different. In 2011, political scientist Shae Garwood wrote:

The anti-sweatshop network has been successful in . . . raising awareness and agenda setting. The network as has also influenced the industry’s adoption of the discourse of responsibility and workers’ rights. . . . As a result of anti-sweatshop advocacy, some targeted corporations have implemented internal social auditing programs. . . . However, the anti-sweatshop network has been unable to achieve . . . behavioral change by manufacturers. This means that workers’ rights and working conditions, as articulated in the WRC code, remain largely unfulfilled.

The main message of this book is that the anti-sweatshop movement’s failure to mandate policies such as minimum wages and working standards is a victory for the sweatshop workers. If the activists had their way, the workers would be worse off.

Straightforward economic reasoning explains why sweatshop jobs are jeopardized by many of the actions taken by First World anti-sweatshop activists. However, because workers choose to work at these firms we know that the workers believe the jobs are the best available alternative for them. Agitating for policies that would take the option of sweatshop employment away from these workers makes the workers worse off. It throws them into a worse alternative now and it undermines the process of economic development that ultimately leads to better paying jobs with better working conditions.