Chapter 7 - Arbitrary particulars and unified particulars

Summary

THE DISTINCTION

There are two sorts of particular, those that have a natural principle of unity and those that do not. The principle of unity is whatever it is that gives us a reason for thinking we have a single particular. It is a natural principle of unity if the principle of unity is there in the world independently of human thought, human conceptualization, or human decisions. It is, of course, controversial whether there are in fact natural principles of unity. With respect to this issue Michael Ayers uses the word ‘realist’ for those who support his position, as I do, that there are particulars with natural principles of unity, and the word ‘conceptualist’ for those who oppose it: “Adopting, then, a ‘realist’ tone of voice, let me say first that physical objects are natural unities or natural structures which come into existence, continue to exist and cease to exist quite independently of any conceptualizing on our part.” It is difficult to know what picture of reality conceptualists are presenting us with; they seem to see reality itself as something obscure or unknowable: “The picture of reality as an amorphous lump, not yet articulated into discrete objects, thus proves to be the correct one, so long as we make the right use of it.” It is also very difficult to argue against this position in general terms.