Also Timaeus and Philebus
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 June 2021
The chapter considers why, and in what sense, Plato thinks that Forms are separate from sense-perceptible things. It argues that the notion of separation Plato operates with is not a purely modal notion, but rather, an essentialist notion: A is separate from B, if, and only if, What A is makes no reference to B, but what B is makes reference to A. It demonstrates that, for Plato, Forms are, in this sense, separate from sense-perceptible things, because what the primary Forms are, such as oneness or likeness, does not have to make reference to sense-perceptible things.
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