Chapter 2 - Internal Operations and the Weak Infrastructural Power of the State

Summary

A leitmotif in the ideology of the Suharto regime that continues to be an abiding obsession with the Indonesian military is the concept of ketertiban “order” (Bourchier 1990, p. 195). Suharto described stability, order and security “as an object of development itself, namely, to make (people) … feel physically secure and have peace of mind, free from fear of threats without and from worrying over disturbance from within”. As a consequence, the military developed a strategy intended to extend its control deep within society thereby penetrating all levels of government for the purpose of maintaining Kamtibmas (Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat, literally “security and orderliness of society”). Underpinning this imposition of what amounted to a military command structure on society was an elaborate ideological apparatus, the basis of which was the doctrine of dwifungsi. While reformasi has effectively consigned dwifungsi to history, the ossification of such philosophies in the TNI will be difficult to eradicate in the short term. One of the fundamental justifications for the military's take over of power in 1965 and the New Order's subsequent dismantling of political parties, trade unions and social organizations was their perception that civilians had failed to maintain order in the economic and political spheres. As a consequence, TNI personnel are socialized to believe that the military is the only force in society with the proven capacity to perceive and protect the interests of the state. Hence it is imbibed not only with the “right but also the duty to act as guardian of the state and the pengayom or “protector” of an immature and volatile society”(ibid.).

This mindset continues to manifest itself in statements by the TNI elite in support of the military's role in internal security, specifically in relation to maintaining Indonesia's territorial integrity. It is a role that is ironically supported by civilian politicians who seek close personal ties to the TNI elite to replace the formal institutional linkages which existed during the Suharto era. Civilian leaders, conditioned through years of military rule and motivated by self-interest, who look to the TNI to “secure the effectiveness of the bureaucracy and save local elites from an increasingly impatient mob”, help perpetuate and rationalize the dwifungsi mentality among the TNI when in reality the dwifungsi (see Chapters 4 and 5 for a more detailed discussion) does not exist as a legitimate military doctrine.