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2 - Twenty-Five Years of Bank of England Independence

An International Perspective

from I - Overview

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 November 2024

By
Petra Geraats
Edited by
Sean Holly ,
Michael McMahon ,
Stephen Millard  and
Anna Watson
Sean Holly
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
Michael McMahon
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Stephen Millard
Affiliation:
National Institute of Economic and Social Research
Anna Watson
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Summary

This paper analyses and discusses how the Bank operated and performed as an independent central bank. It combines a critical evaluation with useful lessons from an international perspective. The Bank’s performance is compared with some of its peers, including the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank and fellow inflation targeters

Keywords

Central bank independenceUS Federal ResearveEuropean Central Bank
Type
Chapter
Information
Reflections on Monetary Policy after 25 Years of the MPC , pp. 10 - 22
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

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Dincer, Nergiz, Eichengreen, Barry and Geraats, Petra (2022), ‘Trends in monetary policy transparency: Further updates’, International Journal of Central Banking. 18(1), 331–48.Google Scholar
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