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3 - Competition Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2023

Björn Lundqvist
Affiliation:
Stockholm University
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Summary

Generally, it might seem that the problem of a few system leaders hoarding data should be addressed by competition law. Market power and monopolizations generally trigger competition-law remedies. However, as will be discussed below, when it comes to accessing data, and especially when access to data should be granted as a continuing service, competition law is generally the wrong platform to use. Access or forced collaboration is difficult to establish under competition law. The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) makes it difficult to succeed in arguing that a refusal to grant access to data is an abuse of market dominance under Article 102 TFEU. Proving market dominance in data-related markets is a challenging undertaking and is highly case specific. Similarly, the very stringent requirements defining abuse were developed for different situations and may need to be adapted to circumstances of the data-driven economy. More importantly, only undertakings would be able to rely on a right to access data under Article 102 TFEU, which would generally exclude access claims of consumers. Finally, the enforcement system of competition law does not seem to be sufficiently effective to guarantee competitive markets for the mass phenomenon of data lock-ins caused by connected devices.1

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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  • Competition Law
  • Björn Lundqvist, Stockholm University
  • Book: Regulating Access and Transfer of Data
  • Online publication: 06 April 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009335195.003
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  • Competition Law
  • Björn Lundqvist, Stockholm University
  • Book: Regulating Access and Transfer of Data
  • Online publication: 06 April 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009335195.003
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Competition Law
  • Björn Lundqvist, Stockholm University
  • Book: Regulating Access and Transfer of Data
  • Online publication: 06 April 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009335195.003
Available formats
×