Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Glossary
- PART I UNDERSTANDING BEIJING'S POLICY
- PART II RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL EVENTS
- 4 Non–Intervention: The 1998 Anti–Chinese Violence in Indonesia
- 5 Direct Protection: Examples from South Pacific, the Middle East and Africa
- 6 Effective Protection? The 2014 Anti–China/Chinese Riots in Vietnam
- 7 From Non–Intervention to Intervention? The “Nude Squat” Episode and Chinese Ambassador Saga in Malaysia
- 8 To help or Not to Help? The Kokang Chinese Problem in Myanmar
- PART III RESPONSES TO INTERNAL NEEDS
- PART IV NEW POLICY AND ITS IMPACT
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
5 - Direct Protection: Examples from South Pacific, the Middle East and Africa
from PART II - RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL EVENTS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 May 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Glossary
- PART I UNDERSTANDING BEIJING'S POLICY
- PART II RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL EVENTS
- 4 Non–Intervention: The 1998 Anti–Chinese Violence in Indonesia
- 5 Direct Protection: Examples from South Pacific, the Middle East and Africa
- 6 Effective Protection? The 2014 Anti–China/Chinese Riots in Vietnam
- 7 From Non–Intervention to Intervention? The “Nude Squat” Episode and Chinese Ambassador Saga in Malaysia
- 8 To help or Not to Help? The Kokang Chinese Problem in Myanmar
- PART III RESPONSES TO INTERNAL NEEDS
- PART IV NEW POLICY AND ITS IMPACT
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
ANTI–CHINESE VIOLENCE IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS AND TONGA
The second example of China's behaviour on Chinese overseas issue involves Beijing's direct intervention in 2006 during anti– Chinese riots in the South Pacific island states of Solomon Islands and Tonga. These incidents took place about eight years after the May 1998 anti–Chinese riots in Indonesia. In the interim period, China had developed further and become more confident in the international arena. Its policy towards the Chinese in these South Pacific countries had clearly shifted from its stance towards the Chinese in Indonesia earlier. However, was this really a major change in Beijing's wider foreign policy's objectives? Had the interests of the Chinese overseas become paramount by 2006? That is, would China protect the interests of the Chinese overseas at all cost? Or was this behaviour in the trajectory of its traditional foreign policy behaviour?
BACKGROUND
The South Pacific islands, which consist of fourteen small independent states, used to be considered an “American Lake”. The United States was the biggest aid donor in the region, which is strategically important as a gateway to the Pacific Ocean. However, after the end of the Cold War, the United States began to downgrade its involvement in the region and its pre–eminent role has been taken over by Australia, followed by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The PRC moved in late 1990s and began to compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition in these small islands states.
Initially, in the mid–1970s, soon after it had won a seat at the United Nations, Beijing managed to establish diplomatic ties with the larger Pacific Island states, such as Fiji, Western Samoa, and Papua New Guinea (PNG), ignoring the smaller states, which it considered insignificant. Later, however, Beijing realized the strategic importance of the smaller states and the presence of Chinese new migrants there. More attention was then paid to the South Pacific. Currently, Beijing has ties with eight Pacific Island states, including the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu, while Taiwan continues to have ties with six countries. including the Solomon Islands, which will be discussed in this chapter. Tonga, which recognizes Beijing, will also be examined.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Rise of China and the Chinese OverseasA Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond, pp. 69 - 94Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2017