Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Glossary
- PART I UNDERSTANDING BEIJING'S POLICY
- PART II RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL EVENTS
- PART III RESPONSES TO INTERNAL NEEDS
- 9 The Use of Chinese Transnationalism: The Sichuan Earthquake and the Beijing Olympic Games
- 10 Direct Control? Beijing and the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Conference
- 11 “One Belt One Road” Strategy and the Chinese Overseas
- 12 Beijing's Soft Power Bid: Promotion of the Chinese Language and Confucius Institutes
- PART IV NEW POLICY AND ITS IMPACT
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
11 - “One Belt One Road” Strategy and the Chinese Overseas
from PART III - RESPONSES TO INTERNAL NEEDS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 May 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Glossary
- PART I UNDERSTANDING BEIJING'S POLICY
- PART II RESPONSES TO EXTERNAL EVENTS
- PART III RESPONSES TO INTERNAL NEEDS
- 9 The Use of Chinese Transnationalism: The Sichuan Earthquake and the Beijing Olympic Games
- 10 Direct Control? Beijing and the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Conference
- 11 “One Belt One Road” Strategy and the Chinese Overseas
- 12 Beijing's Soft Power Bid: Promotion of the Chinese Language and Confucius Institutes
- PART IV NEW POLICY AND ITS IMPACT
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The usefulness of the Chinese overseas to the PRC became apparent when Beijing's top leadership began mentioning in their speeches that the Chinese overseas were crucial for their “One Belt One Road” Strategy. This belief in the usefulness of the Chinese overseas, which was also shared by many Chinese scholars in China, resulted in the further blurring of the distinction between Chinese citizens and foreign citizens of Chinese descent. This chapter addresses briefly the concept of “One Belt One Road”, its ambiguity, and the misperceived role of the Chinese overseas in this strategy. It also discusses its possible impact on China's relations with Southeast Asia.
THE ORIGINS
The “One Belt One Road” Strategy was first proposed by President Xi Jinping in his speech in Kazakhstan in September 2013 and in another speech a month later in Indonesia. In his Kazakhstan speech, Xi mentioned the economic belt of the overland Silk Road, which linked China with Central Asia and Europe, while in the Indonesian speech he proposed a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which would link China to Southeast Asia and beyond.
Soon after the two speeches, Xi's proposal became known as the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) Strategy or Yidai Yilu Zhanlue in Mandarin. There are many explanations for why the OBOR Strategy was proposed. Some believe that the existing global economic institutional framework limits the economic and political role of China. As China becomes developed and stronger, it wants to play a major role in the world arena, freeing itself from the domination of the United States, Europe, and Japan. OBOR and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are being used to achieve this objective.
President Xi himself links the OBOR Strategy to his “China Dream”. He would like to lead the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in order to make China strong again, as in ancient times. In fact, the rapid economic development of China has resulted in three requirements — the need for raw materials, the need to export surplus products, and the need to channel surplus capital — that pit China against Western capitalist countries, which are in a scramble to fulfill similar needs. The proposed OBOR Strategy would be able to meet these requirements.
Nevertheless, reviving the historical concept of the silk road is not without problems.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Rise of China and the Chinese OverseasA Study of Beijing's Changing Policy in Southeast Asia and Beyond, pp. 167 - 181Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2017