8 - To help or Not to Help? The Kokang Chinese Problem in Myanmar

Summary

This chapter deals with the sixth example of China's approach to Chinese overseas issues. It involves China's response to the 2015 Kokang Chinese rebellion in Myanmar (formerly Burma), in which Beijing appeared to have adopted a pragmatic attitude. It should be pointed out here that when we speak of the Chinese overseas we usually refer to “non–homeland minority groups”, i.e., groups of Chinese who do not have their original “homeland” within their respective countries of residence. The only exception to this general characteristic are perhaps the Kokang Chinese in Myanmar, who are a “homeland minority group”, i.e., their original homeland is within Myanmar. It should also be noted that the homeland of the Kokang Chinese is an area that borders China. Hence, there has been a lot of interaction between the Kokang Chinese and the Chinese of mainland China. Owing to these unique characteristics, the Kokang Chinese issue needs to be treated differently from other Chinese overseas issues. Although this study treats the Kokang Chinese case alongside other “overseas Chinese” cases, China's treatment of this special category of Chinese overseas differs from its approach to other groups of Chinese overseas.

INTRODUCTION

On 9 February 2015, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), led by Peng Jiasheng (also known as Phone Kyar Shin or Pheung Kya–shin), suddenly returned to Laukkai, the Kokang capital, from an unknown hideout and attacked the security forces of the Myanmar government. Serious fighting took place, which resulted in the exodus of many of the Kokang Chinese people, mainly to Chinese territory. The fighting lasted several days and there were many casualties on both sides but the MNDAA failed to capture Laukkai, fled to the border, and allegedly entered Chinese territory. The Myanmar army pursued the rebels and fired shells at areas believed to be the hiding place of the MNDAA. The Myanmar air force joined the fighting and on 13 March a Myanmar fighter plane bombed the Chinese side of the border, killing five Chinese villagers and wounding another eight. Beijing protested against this incursion, and Nay Pyi Taw (Naypyitaw) apologized. High–level meetings were then conducted between the two countries to look for a solution.

Nevertheless, fighting continued for more than three months. On 2 June, China conducted live firing exercises in Chinese territory along the Sino–Myanmar border. Tensions immediately rose between the two countries.