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13 - Kripke and Cartesianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

By
Sydney Shoemaker
Edited by
Alan Berger
Alan Berger
Affiliation:
Brandeis University, Massachusetts
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Summary

The metaphysical and semantical ideas Saul Kripke advanced in the early 1970s, in Naming and Necessity and “Identity and Necessity,” have found wide acceptance among philosophers. But what is perhaps the most intriguing application he made of these ideas was in his discussion of the mind/body problem, where his arguments and conclusions are widely regarded as Cartesian in spirit; and here many fewer have been convinced. Those who accept the central ideas of his philosophy, but also accept materialist or physicalist views of the sort Kripke uses these ideas to attack, face the challenge of showing that these are not, as he forcefully argued, incompatible.

Keywords

Naming and NecessityC-fiber stimulationCartesianismSaul Kripkecontingent identitiespain
Type
Chapter
Information
Saul Kripke , pp. 327 - 342
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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References

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