Britain and the sea, 1943–1945

Summary

ABSTRACT.Britain fought as part of an allied coalition which was completely dependent on the sea to connect its different components and to mount all its major military operations. The invasions of Sicily, Italy and France, the campaigns in the East Indies and the Pacific, were wholly dependent on the command of the sea, and on shipping to exploit it. The sea made possible military success, economic survival and political unity.

RÉSUMÉ.La Grande-Bretagne combattit au sein d'une coalition alliée qui dépendait exclusivement de la mer pour connecter ses différentes parties et monter ses principales opérations militaires. Les invasions de la Sicile, de l'Italie et de la France, les campagnes dans le Pacifique et les Indes orientales n'auraient pu être réalisées sans le contrôle de la mer, et son exploitation par le transport maritime. La mer a rendu possible succès militaires, survie économique et unité politique.

When Japan formally surrendered on 2 September 1945, drawing the Second World War to a close, Britain and its Allies were in secure control of all the oceans of the world. During that conflict the Royal Navy played a decisive part in executing a maritime strategy which took centre stage after Britain's withdrawal from the European continent following France's collapse in June 1940. Julian Corbett, the influential British naval historian, has explained that “by maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor”.Corbett was writing in 1911; during 1943–1945, Britain's maritime strategy had evolved to include amphibious and submarine warfare, escort-to-convoy systems, floating logistics organisations or “fleet trains”, air power(both ship-borne and shore-based) and economic and naval blockade.

The ability to execute such a broad maritime strategy was based, in part, upon centuries of experience at sea. The Second World War was not the first time that Britain had fought successfully against a determined foe to control sea communications across the world's oceans and its own narrow coastal waters, while also bringing force to bear against its enemies by projecting power ashore. By securing command of the seas the latter were, concomitantly, also denied to the enemy to help support its war effort. Captain Stephen Roskill, the British official historian of the War at Sea volumes, has argued that maritime power depended upon three elements: strength, security and transport.