The Italian offensive, 1940–1941

Summary

ABSTRACT.Fascist Italy had a second-class navy but an outstanding strategic position astride Britain's most essential imperial line of communication. It built an impressive fleet to express its great-power aspirations, though its real advantage lay in the asymmetric “stealth weapons” with which it achieved several triumphs to make up for the disappointments of orthodox warfare. The Italian–German alliance supported its army in North Africa and went a long way to neutralizing British naval strength, but by 1942 it had run out of fuel to send the Italian battleships to sea.

RÉSUMÉ.l'Italie fasciste n'avait qu'une marine de seconde catégorie mais une position stratégique exceptionnelle, à cheval sur la voie de communication la plus importante de l'empire britannique. Le pays construisit une flotte impressionnante qui reflétait ses aspirations de grande puissance. Mais son réel avantage consistait en la possession d'armes furtives asymétriques. Grâce à elles, l'Italie parvint à remporter plusieurs triomphes qui compensèrent les déceptions engendrées par la guerre traditionnelle. l'alliance germano-italienne soutint l'armée en Afrique du Nord et parvint même à neutraliser la force navale britannique. Mais en 1942, à court de pétrole, l'alliance ne put plus envoyer les cuirassés italiens en mer.

THE IRONY OF ITALIAN SEA POWER

There were three ironies for Italian sea power in the Mediterranean during its brief efflorescence in 1940 and 1941. The first was that Italy itself was a secondclass power in naval terms, but Italy's geographical position, and its choice of Britain as an enemy, gave it an enormously strong operational position in the Central Mediterranean.

In particular Italy dominated west–east passage of the Mediterranean via the Sicilian Narrows, the point at which the gap between Europe and North Africa was at its shortest. Its bases in southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia could not be replicated by any other power. By the same measure, the route between Italy and its “fourth shore”, its colonies in Libya, was short and relatively secure. The Italians had prepared for a naval war against Britain and France. But the Germans had defeated France before Italy entered the war, yielding an even more advantageous operational position.

The second irony was that Italy's naval leaders well understood how to maximize the strength of their operational position – through the deployment of mezzi insidiosi, “insidious methods” of asymmetric warfare – yet only episodically held to such methods.