The sea and the Soviet Empire

Summary

ABSTRACT.Growing naval power was an essential component of the Soviet challenge to the West, but Western perception of it was badly distorted by the assumption that the Soviets were building an American-style “battle-fleet” – which in fact was well beyond its economy and technology. In the 1970s the Soviet merchant fleet was built up to carry food imports and to earn hard currency. In both cases, however, investment in the sea was part of a defensive strategy and strictly subordinate to the land.

RÉSUMÉ.Former une puissance navale était une composante essentielle du défisoviétique face à l'Occident. Mais la perception qu'en avaient les pays occidentaux fut largement faussée par leur supposition que les soviétiques construisaient une « flotte de guerre » à l'américaine, ce qui s'avéra être bien au-delà de leur économie et de leur technologie. Dans les années 1970, la flotte marchande soviétique fut construite pour permettre l'importation de nourriture et rapporter une devise forte. Dans les deux cas, cependant, l'investissement dans le domaine maritime fit partie d'une stratégie de défense et fut toujours subordonnée à la terre.

The Soviet empire found itself compelled to compete strategically at sea with its Western foes, yet systemically constrained by factors which it could not change. A major difficulty in assessing the value of sea power to the Soviet empire is uncertainty as to the proper standard of measurement. What might that sea power have achieved, and how well or poorly did it perform? These are the core concerns requiring answer here. Two leading Western commentators observed in 1989 as follows:

Over the last thirty years the Soviet Union has developed from a minor naval power with largely coastal capabilities and has become a major sea power able to challenge the supremacy of the US Navy throughout the world.

These observers of the Soviet Navy in the Cold War were well informed about their subject, yet the assessment proved seriously flawed. Soviet sea power was not really embarked upon a global expansion of presence and influence, even though its technical capabilities assuredly improved to a remarkable degree through the 1960s, 1970s and well into the 1980s. It is now quite apparent that the Soviet Navy in the Cold War was insolubly limited by contextual constraints. The picture painted by Western commentators in the mid- to late 1980s was soon shown to be at least partially illusory.