Preliminary Evidence from Japan
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2019
Laws are made by the judiciary as well as by the legislative and the executive branches of government. This book chapter explores how the career judge system of Japan affects the efficiency of court decisions both theoretically and empirically. We find evidence that judges under the career judge system are tempted to place great weight on case-handling efficiency rather than substantive efficiency, which leads to socially efficient outcomes in some cases, but suboptimal outcomes in others. We also highlight several important factors for the analysis of court behavior.
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