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Chapter 8 - The enduring trouble with tracking

from Part II - Criticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2012

By
Jonathan Vogel
Edited by
Kelly Becker  and
Tim Black
Kelly Becker
Affiliation:
University of New Mexico
Tim Black
Affiliation:
California State University, Northridge
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Summary

This chapter shows how the logic and semantics of counterfactuals create formidable problems for the tracking account. It presents counterexamples to the tracking account and considers its extensional adequacy more broadly. Then, the chapter examines Keith DeRose's view that sensitivity theorists have nothing to fear from counterexamples. The chapter discusses a family of propositions which the tracking account wrongly treats as unknowable. The tracking account is incompatible with knowledge by induction, despite various arguments to the contrary. The logical and semantic properties of subjunctive conditionals have been investigated in depth for decades. The clash between the tracking condition and the Closure Principle is a principal reason why the tracking account has been interesting and important to epistemologists. The tracking account can survive only if there is some way to reconcile it with knowledge by induction.

Keywords

explanationist counterfactualismred barnSaul KripkeWilliamsonSosaskeptical debateskepticism
Type
Chapter
Information
The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology , pp. 122 - 151
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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