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from Part II - Choice Hylomorphism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 June 2021
This chapter discusses Aquinas’s account of the freedom of the judgment of choice. It claims that, on his view, this judgment is free because it is up to us whether or not we assent to its propositional content, which Aquinas takes to be a means-end-relating precept. It examines what explains our ability to freely assent to a precept. It argues that this is explained by the logical structure of the precept that the agent assents to. In particular, the precept in question must fail to establish a necessary relation between a given means and the ultimate end. A precept fails to do this if it (1) relates an expedient, but non-necessary means to a non-ultimate end, or (2) a necessary means to a non-ultimate end, or (3) an expedient, but non-necessary means to the ultimate end. It also argues that the logical structure of the precept alone is not enough to guarantee our freedom of assent. An agent must also understand that a precept fails to establish a necessary relation between a means and the ultimate end in order to freely assent to it. To grasp this structure, the agent has to engage in a kind of higher-order judgment.
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